If consumers wholly or partially control a …rm with market power they will charge less than the pro…t maximizing price. Starting at the usual monopoly price, a small price reduction will have a second order e¤ect on pro…ts but a …rst order e¤ect on consumer surplus. Despite this desirable static result, it has been argued that cooperatives are vulnerable to take-over by outsiders who will run them as for-pro…t businesses. This paper studies takeovers of cooperatives. We argue that there will not be excessive takeovers of cooperatives due to the Grossman-Hart problem of free riding during takeovers.
INTRODUCTION

Background
In many cases production is not organized in conventional for-pro…t joint stock companies. The alternatives include worker and consumer cooperatives, partnerships, not for pro…t …rms and even joint stock companies where the shares are owned by trading partners. Moreover smaller limited companies often deviate from the textbook model of pro…t maximization. These di¤erences between types of organization do not appear random (for instance driven by political tastes) but instead are systematically related to the type of industry in which …rms operate. Moreover these organizations seem relatively stable and persist over long periods of time.
Cooperatives have been shown to have desirable static properties, since they can often reduce market distortions such as those due to monopoly or externalities, see for instance, Hart and Moore (1996) , Roemer (1993) or Renstrom and Yalcin (2003) .
However it is often argued that cooperatives have unsatisfactory dynamic performance since they do not have the correct incentives for investment and are vulnerable to takeover by an outsider who aims to convert them into pro…t maximizing …rms, see Farrell (1985) . The present paper takes up the second issue and argues that cooperatives may be less vulnerable to the threat of take-over than previously believed. Hansmann (1996) cites a number of examples where …rms are owned by those who trade with them either on input or output markets. He argues that, in many cases, this is to counter monopoly or monopsony power. This practice is very common among …rms, which supply inputs to or buy produce from farms. Refsell (1914) explains in detail how cooperative grain elevators came to dominate the mid-west. Their share of the industry expanded rapidly at the expense of for-pro…t rivals during the period [1903] [1904] [1905] [1906] [1907] [1908] [1909] [1910] [1911] [1912] [1913] . It is clear from his account that the main reason for this was a response to monopoly pricing by for-pro…t grain elevators. In relatively remote rural areas, it is easier to establish a local monopoly. This is not an isolated example. Cooperatives supply inputs to farms and purchase their produce in many countries. Some of them have forward integrated into processing distribution and marketing and as a result have become quite large organizations. A number of well-known brand names have been developed by farmers'cooperatives such as Welchs, Sun-Maid and Sun Kist. 1 The reason that such organizations come into existence and thrive is that in relatively remote rural areas competition is not possible due to the small scale of the market. If these businesses were organized on a for-pro…t basis they would have monopoly power. Farm cooperatives (at least partially) internalize the distortion and thus bring about an improvement in allocative e¢ ciency. For similar reasons many professional services, such as lawyers and accountants, are provided by partnerships.
A possible explanation is that the …rm is a monopoly supplier of inputs such as client lists, which these people need to work. Partnerships reduce the distortion in prices.
Viewed this way a legal partnership has some features in common with an agricultural cooperative.
Monopoly Power and Cooperatives
This paper is related to the general equilibrium literature on imperfect competition, see for instance Gabszewicz and Vial (1972) . In general equilibrium with imperfect competition the Fisher Separation Theorem breaks down. Shareholders will typically not wish the …rm to maximize pro…ts.
2 This is because with imperfect competition the …rm's decisions will, in general, a¤ect prices throughout the economy. Shareholders will be a¤ected by the …rm's decisions both because their incomes depend on pro…ts and because the …rm can directly a¤ect the prices they face. In general the second e¤ect is non zero hence they will not wish to maximize pro…t but also take account of the …rm's impact on prices. In such circumstances a pro…t maximizing …rm may yield lower utility to shareholder/consumers than another form of organization.
These arguments show that consumer ownership of monopolies may be bene…cial, see, Demichelis and Ritzberger (2006), Farrell (1985) and Kelsey and Milne (2008) . In circumstances where competition is not possible, monopoly distortions are reduced without government intervention. Consider a …rm that is the sole producer of a particular good. Suppose that consumers have a substantial in ‡uence over its pricing and output decisions. It is in the interest of consumer-shareholders to set the price below the monopoly level, since a small price reduction will result in a second order loss of pro…ts but a …rst order gain in their consumer surplus. If a …rm faces input markets which are imperfectly competitive, then a similar argument establishes it may be desirable to give input suppliers in ‡uence in decisions.
A number of di¤erent legal arrangements may serve to give consumers and/or suppliers in ‡uence in decision-making. If the input concerned is a form of labour, the …rm could be a worker cooperative or a partnership. Professional partnerships serve to supply only those kinds of labour for which there is a market distortion, while other kinds of labour can be hired on a standard wage contract. Consumer cooperatives would serve to control monopoly power in output markets. Alternatively the interested parties could hold blocks of shares in a limited liability company.
The latter possibility is discussed in more detail in section 3.3.
Stability of Cooperatives
Despite the desirable static properties of consumer ownership it has been argued that such a …rm will not be stable in the long-run. For instance, Farrell (1985) argues that consumer-controlled monopolies may be vulnerable to takeover. 4 To understand his argument, consider a consumer-owned monopoly, which is selling below the pro…t-maximising price. Farrell argues that a raider (who is not a consumer) could buy up shares at the current value and then make a pro…t by increasing the product price, thereby increasing the value of his/her shares. This will reduce the utility of a majority of the members of the cooperative. Although they sell their shares at a premium, the subsequent price rise will reduce their consumer surplus. It is possible that a member who only makes small purchases of the …rm's output will gain. However total surplus is reduced since, aggregated over all ex-ante members of the cooperative, the losses out-weight the gains. There is, in addition, a redistribution of wealth from the members of the cooperative to the raider. Thus there is a strong presumption that social welfare is reduced.
The members of the cooperative will typically be worse o¤ if the takeover succeeds, however Farrell argues that they will accept the raider's o¤er because the output price is a public good for shareholders. As usual, free-rider problems imply that they will not internalize the bene…ts to others of a low price and hence will accept the o¤er. Corneo (1997) argues that the because of the vulnerability of cooperatives to takeover, a publicly owned …rm might be superior. In his model there is a publicly owned …rm with increasing returns to scale. Corneo assumes that prices are determined by the median voter. This could be the result ether of direct or indirect democracy. In this context, marginal cost pricing is (…rst-best) e¢ cient but will result in losses, which need to be …nanced through general taxation. For similar reasons to that already discussed in the context of cooperatives, the median voter rule will result in a price below the pro…t maximizing monopoly level. However majority voting will only result in marginal cost pricing if the mean and median voter have the same preferences. Our result says that if the median voter gets less bene…t from the cooperative than the mean voter it is pro…table for the raider to buy up the shares of the 50% of the members who get least bene…t from the cooperative and convert it into a pro…t maximizing …rm. For a public …rm takeovers are not possible. However the protection a¤orded by public ownership is not absolute since there is always the possibility of privatization. If the median taxpayer received less bene…t from public ownership than the mean taxpayer then there may be political pressure to privatize the …rm. 5 In other words these arguments suggest that privatization is more likely for publicly owned …rms which tend to bene…t better o¤ tax-payers. Hansmann (1996) shows that mutual banks and insurance companies gained business at the expense of for pro…t rivals in the nineteenth century. He argues that this was because they had superior monitoring abilities, which enabled them to control moral hazard. In particular the nature of the deposit contract meant that for-pro…t banks have an incentive to make excessively risky investments. If successful, the bank owners take all the gains, while depositors bear the bulk of the losses if the investments fail. In a mutual bank, which could be a trust or a cooperative of depositors, there is no residual claimant. Thus the potential gains from risk-taking are reduced. Mutual banks also had superior abilities to control moral hazard by borrowers. Throughout the twentieth century increased regulation reduced the scope for moral hazard. In particular widespread deposit insurance gave savers less reason to prefer mutual banks. As result they became less common. 
Takeovers of Cooperatives
In the present paper we study takeovers of cooperatives. The model is based on a twostage game between a raider and the members of the cooperative. In the …rst stage, the raider decides whether to make an o¤er for the members'shares and how much to bid. Secondly the members simultaneously decide whether or not to accept the o¤er. We show that raider can only take over the …rm if (s)he can increase its value by more than the bene…t the median shareholder gets from the cooperative. If the median and mean members have the same preferences this implies that takeovers will only occur if they maximize total surplus. Or equivalently takeovers can only cause ine¢ ciency when the preferences of the median and the mean member are di¤erent.
We also study a sequential model which demonstrates that our results are reasonably robust in the sense that they do not depend crucially on the sequence of moves.
Suppose in the initial situation the cooperative chooses its price to maximize the total surplus of its members. This will involve pricing below the monopoly level. Let o denote the value of the shares in the initial situation. If the …rm raised prices to the pro…t maximizing level, then the value of its shares would increase to 1 > o :
Consider the possibility that a raider o¤ers to buy the shares at price q, per share, and increase the value by reorganising the former cooperative as a pro…t maximizing …rm. For the raider to be able to make a pro…t it is necessary that 1 > q > o . Farrell (1985) identi…es the following problem: if each member of a large cooperative decides individually whether or not to accept the raider's o¤er, then any given member will prefer a small premium over the current market price and (s)he will see the success or failure of the takeover as independent of his/her own decision, (i.e.
an individual does not take into account that his/her decision might be pivotal to turn a failure of the takeover into a success) and might eliminate the total bene…t to members of being able to buy the good at a low price.
In the present paper we identify a similar e¤ect which gives an individual member an incentive to reject the o¤er. Suppose that a given member does not take into account the possibility that his/her decision may a¤ect the success or failure of the takeover. The given member will prefer to reject the o¤er and wait to get the posttakeover price 1 rather than accept the o¤er now and receive q < 1 : In other words the given member does not take into account the possibility that his/her decision might be crucial for the success or failure of the takeover. The second e¤ect is similar to the free-riding problem identi…ed by Grossman and Hart (1980) .
Organization of the paper The next section contains our main model of takeovers.
Section 2.4 discusses some limitations of the model in particular the assumption that information is symmetric. Our conclusions can be found in section 3, which discusses how our analysis may be extended from imperfect competition to other market distortions. The appendix contains the statements and proofs of some technical lemmas used to establish the main results.
TAKEOVERS
We consider a …rm, which is the sole producer of a good or service. Suppose the …rm is initially organized as a cooperative, we show that provided the preferences of the members are not too diverse, it is not a pro…table strategy to take it over and reorganize it as a pro…t-maximizing …rm.
In addition to cooperatives we wish to study other situations where production is undertaken by organizations which are not conventional for-pro…t joint stock companies. It is impractical to model all of the possible cases in detail. Instead we have focused on one central case. The key assumptions are that shares can be traded and that once the raider has the support of a majority of shares he can take control.
These are chosen because they are, if anything, favourable to the raider. Even in this case, we …nd that there is no reason to believe that the number of takeovers will be excessive. We shall discuss how our results would change with di¤erent assumptions in section 2.4.
Model
Consider a cooperative of M individuals or members, 1 6 i 6 M: For simplicity assume that M is odd, so that there is a well-de…ned median voter.
Thus a group of individuals has a majority if and only if it contains at least m members.
In the initial situation, assume that individual i gets bene…ts 0 + d i ; from shares in the …rm. Here 0 denotes the current value of the …rm's pro…ts and d i denotes the value of being able to purchase the good below the monopoly price. These bene…ts are experienced, whether or not the individual owns shares in the …rm. 7 We assume that the individuals are numbered so that
Apart from ruling out indi¤erence, this is without loss of generality. Assume that decisions are made by majority rule, so a change will be introduced if at least half the members approve.
We consider the following model of a takeover attempt. First a raider decides whether or not to o¤er to purchase the shares from members at price q: Then the existing shareholders decide simultaneously and independently whether or not to accept. If the raider is successful, (s)he will increase pro…ts to 1 > o by raising price.
Suppose a raider o¤ers to takeover the …rm at a price of q per share. Let i denote a given member of the cooperative. Initially (s)he receives bene…t 0 + d i : Assume (s)he accepts the o¤er and the takeover fails, then (s)he can continue to receive the bene…t d i ; hence his/her payo¤ is q + d i : On the other hand if the takeover succeeds, the raider will adopt pro…t-maximizing policies and eliminate the bene…t d i ; thus i's payo¤ will be q: If i rejects the o¤er and the takeover fails his/her payo¤ will be unchanged at 0 + d i : When the takeover succeeds the private bene…t is eliminated, however the value of the shares will increase, thus i's payo¤ is 1 : The following table summarizes the pay-o¤ of individual i in the various possible outcomes. 8 takeover succeeds takeover fails
The following result says that a successful takeover is possible if and only if the amount by which the raider can increase the value of the …rm is greater than the bene…t which the median shareholder gets from the controlling the monopoly distortion.
Proposition 2.1 A necessary and su¢ cient condition for the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies, in which the raider succeeds in taking over the …rm is:
The following result characterizes the e¢ ciency properties of the equilibrium. Let 
Proof. Takeovers are e¢ cient if
If d = d m ; takeovers will occur if and only if they increase total surplus. Say that a cooperative is internally e¢ cient if the level of externalities (direct or pecuniary) it provides for its members satis…es the Samuleson condition for public goods. There is a related result by Bowen (1943) who shows that if the median voter and the mean voter have the same preferences then majority voting will result in e¢ cient provision of public goods. Together the two results imply that a cooperative which is internally e¢ cient, can only be taken over when it is socially desirable in the sense that the raider increases the total surplus.
So far we have assumed that the d i are exogenous. However in practice these parameters can often be in ‡uenced by the design of the constitution of the cooperative and selection of members. Hansmann (1996) There is a potential distortion within cooperatives. If decisions are made by a majority vote, the outcome will coincide with the preference of the median voter.
However the cost will be born by the mean voter. If the median and mean voter have very di¤erent preferences then it is possible that the median voter will use the cooperative to make implicit transfers from the mean voter to himself/herself. If such distortions occur, the cooperative is unlikely to be e¢ cient.
Sequential O¤ers
We believe that our argument is reasonably robust and does not depend crucially on the details of the interaction between the raider and the cooperative. As an alternative consider the possibility that the raider approached the members sequentially rather than simultaneously. This situation could be modelled as an n + 1 stage game. First the raider quotes a price q at which (s)he is prepared to buy shares. Then each shareholder in turn decides whether or not to accept the o¤er, i.e. …rst individual 1 decides then individual 2 decides,..., …nally individual M decides. There is complete and perfect information.
The next result studies the equilibrium of the sequential model. We …nd that the necessary and su¢ cient condition for the takeover to succeed is the same as in the simultaneous model.
Proposition 2.3
In the sequential model of takeovers, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies, in which the raider succeeds in taking over the …rm is:
The e¢ ciency properties of the sequential takeover model are similar to those of the simultaneous move model. This follows since the necessary and su¢ cient condition for a successful takeover is the same in both cases.
Constitutions for Cooperatives
In those cases where the takeover fails, the raider does not succeed for the reasons identi…ed in Grossman and Hart (1980) . The existing shareholders free-ride on the price of shares. By not accepting the o¤er, shareholders bene…t from the increase in price without contributing to the costs of the takeover. Grossman and Hart argue that …rms have incentives to overcome the free-rider problem by adopting constitutions, which allow raiders to either compulsorily purchase minority shares or dilute the rights of minority shareholders. Alternatively it may be desirable for government to introduce legislation allowing compulsory purchase of minority shares (as in the UK).
In the present context, the raider's behaviour is undesirable to existing cooperative members and probably society in general. It is in the interest of the cooperative to introduce a constitution, which gives strong protection to minority rights. This will make free-riding easier and consequently reduce the chances of a hostile takeover.
Hansmann (1996) shows that most consumer cooperatives allocate voting rights in proportion to the fraction of the output purchased. This would be one way to protect against takeovers. It is worth noting that most governments o¤er separate laws dealing with cooperatives and business …rms. Protection against takeover may be more desirable for cooperatives.
In practice, cooperatives do not act naively when faced with strategic players.
Refsell (1914) documents how cooperative grain elevators were established in the mid-west despite a number of attempts by a cartel of grain dealers to prevent them.
Both sides were clearly acting strategically. For instance, the for pro…t …rms tried to organize boycotts to prevent the wholesalers in Chicago from dealing with cooperatives. In practice, shares in cooperatives are not freely traded. Members are often required to sell their shares back to the cooperative if they wish to leave. Decisions are made on the basis of 'one member one vote'not one 'share one vote'. Hence a potential raider would have to convince a majority of members not the holders of a majority of shares that (s)he was o¤ering a good deal. These various legal restrictions make it harder to takeover a cooperative than is implied by our assumptions.
Thus our model is, if anything, more favourable to the raider than institutions are in practice.
Alternative Assumptions
This section considers some alternative assumptions and discusses how they would a¤ect our conclusions. In particular we consider asymmetric information, the possibility that it takes more than a simple majority to turn the cooperative into a for-pro…t …rm or that non-members bene…t from externalities created by the cooperative.
Firstly we have used a model with symmetric information. It is di¢ cult to give precise predictions about the e¤ects of asymmetric information since there are many possible kinds of informational asymmetries. Generally the literature on information economics, shows that an agent with an informational disadvantage will ceteris paribus make lower pro…t. It seems most likely that the raider will have an informational disadvantage, in which case takeovers will be more di¢ cult than in the symmetric information model.
Another implication of the absence of informational asymmetries is that members of the cooperative know whether or not their votes are pivotal. As a result pivotal voters reject the take-over, while non pivotal voters vote in favour. The e¤ects of incomplete information are ambiguous. It is possible that some pivotal voters might not realise that they are pivotal and hence vote for the takeover when this is not actually in their interests. However it is equally possible that non-pivotal voters might vote against the takeover because of the possibility that they might be pivotal.
In practice, cooperatives may need a super-majority vote to sell the …rm to an outsider, (i.e. it might require a two thirds or 75% majority to approve the sale). We believe that the issues raised in this paper are one of the main reasons that such rules are used. Often shares in cooperatives are not openly traded. Both possibilities tend to make takeovers even more di¢ cult. This would tend to strengthen our conclusion that ine¢ cient takeovers are unlikely to occur in equilibrium. However super-majority rules would have the e¤ect of preventing some takeovers which increase social surplus.
It is possible that the cooperative generates externalities (either direct or pecuniary) for some nonmembers. For small group externalities, e.g. a group of farmers running a cooperative grain elevator or a professional partnership using a common client list, it is practical to include all or nearly all bene…ciaries. For a …rm which produced more widespread externalities (e.g. a …rm such as Microsoft with global market power) it is almost inevitable that many nonmembers will also bene…t. This would result in the …rm producing a positive externality. For the usual reasons this externality would be under-produced in equilibrium. In particular too many takeovers would succeed in equilibrium. (Assuming the social objective is maximizing total surplus.)
This problem would not arise if the cooperative either refuses to trade with nonmembers or charges non-members commercial prices. Both practices are not uncommon.
(Even some for-pro…t companies practice price discrimination between shareholders and others.)
Our results would need to be modi…ed if the raider received private bene…ts of control from a successful takeover. In this case (s)he can a¤ord to pay more than the maximised pro…t per share, which will increase his/her chances of success. However note that the private bene…t makes the reduction in total surplus from a takeover smaller than it would be otherwise. Indeed if the private bene…t is greater than the total surplus in the initial situation then such a takeover would be e¢ cient. On the other hand if the current cooperative members receive non-monetary bene…ts from the status quo this will mean the raider has to make a higher o¤er for the takeover to succeed. Hence takeovers will be less likely. Similarly if the …rm were in a line of business in which for-pro…t …rms were intrinsically more e¢ cient then takeovers would be more likely than our analysis suggests. However as Hansmann (1996) argues there are many circumstances in which a cooperative form is more e¢ cient, which would tend to reduce the raider's chances of success.
Although our model is somewhat stylized we believe that it is not highly unrealistic. One way a cooperative may be taken over by a for-pro…t …rm is a two stage process. In the …rst the cooperative is converted into a limited liability company by giving the members equal (or pro rata) amounts of equity in the new company.
In the second stage, an outsider makes a tender o¤er for the shares of the former cooperative. Our analysis would apply to the second stage of such a process.
CONCLUSION
We have shown that, under some assumptions, cooperatives are not vulnerable to takeover by a raider who wishes to turn them into a pro…t-maximizing …rm, except in circumstances where the cooperative form is unlikely to be e¢ cient. In this conclusion we argue that this analysis is more widely applicable since other market distortions can be analysed in a similar way. We consider oligopolistic industries, distortions in input markets and industries with externalities. Moreover the theory applies to a wider range of …rms than cooperatives such as partnerships or for-pro…t …rms where the shares are wholly or partly-owned by consumers or other trading partners.
Oligopolistic Markets
The analysis so far has considered a cooperative, which is the only producer in its industry. If instead the industry is oligopolistic, there is a second e¤ect which also acts to make takeovers di¢ cult. Reorganizing a cooperative as a for-pro…t …rm will change the objective function of the …rm and this will in turn change the product market equilibrium. If …rms compete Cournot-style, the changes are likely to be unfavourable to the raider. Replacing a cooperative by a for-pro…t …rm will cause that …rm to charge a higher price and produce a lower quantity for any given market conditions. Rivals will respond by producing more output which will reduce the pro…ts of the …rm. (Provided reaction curves are downward sloping, as is usual under Cournot competition.) It is possible that this e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong for the ex-post pro…t to be lower. For a more detailed discussion of the relation between corporate governance and product market equilibrium see Kelsey and Milne (2008) . 
Other Market Distortions
So far we have focused on imperfect competition in output markets. However the analysis would also apply to some other market distortions. Similar arguments have been advanced to show that industrial democracy can reduce the impact of asymmetric information (Hansmann (1996) ) and externalities (Kelsey and Milne (2006) and Roemer (1993) ). Consider a …rm which produces an externality. Then starting at the pro…t maximizing level, shareholders have an interest to reduce/increase a negative/positive externality since a change will have a second order e¤ect on pro…ts but the direct a¤ect on utility will be …rst order.
Our theory can be modi…ed to study a …rm which provides an externality for its owners. The variable d i can be reinterpreted as as the net bene…t individual i gets from a positive externality produced by the …rm or the value to individual i of controlling a negative externality. In our model the bene…ts are received whether or not the individual owns shares in the …rm. This assumption is clearly valid for physical externalities such as pollution. It is likely to hold for most pecuniary externalities between …rms. It may or may not hold for other externalities.
Local Public Companies
In this section we argue that local public companies have many features in common with cooperatives and review the empirical evidence. In both cases the organizational form enables owner-shareholders to economize on monitoring costs, and/or other market distortions.
Franks, Mayer, and Rossi (2009) (henceforth FMR) examine detailed data on the evolution of ownership patterns of 60 U.K. …rms over the twentieth century. In the …rst half of the century, legal investor protection was weak, yet the regional stockmarkets thrived. These markets traded local …rms and their shares were held largely by local shareholders. According to FMR informal mechanisms of trust were used to in ‡uence boards of local directors. They observe that even though there was dispersion of ownership over time, local concentration of ownership continued to be dominant. FMR argue that the evidence on takeovers shows that the same price was o¤ered to all shareholders even in the absence of investor regulatory protection.
Later in the century, this local dominance declined as regional stock-markets were replaced by the London market and institutional shareholders representing geographically dispersed shareholders became more important. Trust and local informal mechanisms were replaced by more formal legal mechanisms.
In the study by FMR, it would be instructive to see from U.K. data, if local public companies attracted shareholders who faced pecuniary externalities that arose from the actions of the …rm, either as consumers of their output or suppliers of inputs.
These overlapping interests may have been formalized by mergers and takeovers so that potential con ‡icts could have been resolved. Over the twentieth century, as geographic dispersion of the …rms' activities grew by acquisitions and shareholders became more geographically dispersed, this pecuniary e¤ect may have diminished.
During this time, due to a number of factors, mutual or cooperative …rms became less common. This could be explained by the same process of erosion in local trust mechanisms for monitoring. An increase in regulatory protection reduced the need for less formal systems of monitoring. Local pecuniary e¤ects were eroded by increased competition and direct externalities were reduced due to dispersion and mobility of …rms and investors.
Another possible application would be to a conventional company created and owned by a small number of businesses that are interested in purchasing its product.
This is similar to a local public company, since any externalities are con…ned to a relatively small group of economic agents. If this similarity in product and input market imperfections for cooperatives and corporations is important for governance structures, then our argument for the stability of ownership, and internalization of externalities, would operate for both cooperatives, locally owned public companies and public companies with customer-supplier relationships.
A APPENDIX
This appendix contains the proofs of our main results.
A.1 Simultaneous Move Takeover Model
If q > 1 ; the raider can never make a positive pro…t, hence we may assume 1 > q > in this set. Of course L depends on the price q at which the raider o¤ers to buy the shares. Let G = f1; :::; M g nL denote the remaining individuals. Loosely speaking G are the gainers and L are the losers from having production organized in a cooperative.
Lemma A.1 If m >`; then in any pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the subgame following the raider's o¤er, precisely m 1 individuals accept. In particular all members of L accept the o¤er. Proof of Proposition 2.1 Since individuals will not accept the o¤er unless it is in their interest to do so, for the o¤er to succeed it is necessary that q be su¢ ciently high that f1; :::; mg L:
To make a pro…t it is necessary that 1 > q: By Lemma A.1, if the raider made an o¤er q such that q o < d m she would not get enough acceptances to gain control of the …rm. Hence the raider would make a loss of (m 1) ( 0 q) : It follows that making such an o¤er is not part of any subgame perfect equilibrium.
If the raider o¤ers to buy the shares at price
:::; mg : (We assume that indi¤erence is resolved in favour of the raider.) By Lemma A.2 precisely m individuals will accept the o¤er hence the raider will gain control of the …rm and make a pro…t of m ( 1 q) :
In the subgames described in Lemmas A.1 and A.2, there are multiple Nash equilibria. As in other situations where equilibrium is not unique, this creates a potential coordination problem, i.e. how do players know which of the possibly many equilibrium strategies they should play? We believe the coordination problem here is not as severe as it is in some other games because this game is not symmetric.
Hence there are many coordination devices which could be used to select a particular Nash equilibrium. Consider, for instance, the case in Lemma A.2 where the takeover succeeds. Then some but not all of the group of individuals who get low bene…t from the cooperative vote for the takeover. Let L + (resp. L ) denote those members of L who vote for (resp. against) the takeover. The above proof shows that any situation where m individuals are in L is a Nash equilibrium. One of these in particular is focal, where the m individuals with the lowest bene…ts from the cooperative vote for the takeover. (Recall this is a game of complete and perfect information so all players know the pay-o¤s of the others.)
A.2 Sequential Takeover Model
This section of the appendix contains proofs of our claims about the sequential move takeover model. For this section we do not make the assumption that d 1 < d 2 < ::: < d M ; since it is not without loss of generality in the sequential move game.
Recall we have de…ned L = fi; 0 + d i 6 qg to be the set of individuals whose total bene…t from the cooperative is less than the raider's o¤er and`to denote the number of individuals in this set. Let G = f1; :::; M g nL denote the remaining individuals.
Loosely speaking G are the gainers and L are the losers from having production organized in a cooperative. First we shall analyse the subgame following the raider's o¤er.
Lemma A.3 If m >`then in the sub-game following the raider's o¤er a takeover will not succeed. In particular all members of L will accept the o¤er and the …rst m 1 `members of G will accept. The remaining members of G will reject the o¤er.
Proof. We claim that the following set of strategies are a subgame perfect equilibrium of the sub-game following the raider's o¤er.
Members of L accept the raider's o¤er unless at least m + 1 `members of G have already accepted.
Members of G will accept the takeover bid if less than m 1 `members of G have accepted previously and will reject otherwise.
To check this constitutes a sub-game perfect equilibrium. First note that it is clear no member of L will reject the o¤er on the equilibrium path. (Rejecting would reduce the member's own pay-o¤ and make the take-over less likely to happen.) Therefore we shall not consider any history in which members of L reject the takeover.
11
To check members of L are playing best responses, consider a given individual, 2 L: There are three sub-cases to consider depending on the history.
-At most m 1 `members of G have already accepted the raider's o¤er. In this case, the o¤er will be rejected regardless of what decides. Accepting is a best response for since it yields q + d > o + d ; which is his/her pay-o¤ if (s)he rejects.
11 It might be in the interest of a member of L to reject the o¤er if su¢ ciently many members of G had accepted to make the success of the takeover a certainty. However such a history can only arise if there are multiple deviations from the equilibrium path. One can easily check that the proposed subgame perfect equilibrium is robust to such deviations. is pivotal, by accepting (s)he will obtain q > o + d . -If precisely m 1 `members of G have accepted previously then g is pivotal. In equilibrium g will reject the o¤er after this history. This yields g pay-o¤, o + d g > q; which is his/her pay-o¤ if (s)he accepts.
-If at least m `members of G have accepted previously then the takeover will succeed regardless of what g does. In this case g by rejecting gets payo¤ 1 > q; which is what (s)he would have received if (s)he had accepted.
Lemma A.4 If m 6`then in a subgame perfect equilibrium of the sequential move game, all members of G and the …rst` m members of L will reject the o¤er and the remaining members of L will accept.
Proof. We claim,the following set of strategies constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium:
Members of L reject the raider's o¤er if less than` m members of L have rejected previously and will accept otherwise.
Members of G will reject the raider's o¤er unless` m 1 members of L have rejected previously in which case they accept.
To check this constitutes a sub-game perfect equilibrium. We shall not consider histories where members of G accept the raider's o¤er. It is easy to show that such individuals are not playing best responses.
To check members of L are playing best responses, consider a given individual, 2 L: There are three sub-cases to consider depending on the history. -The takeover will fail regardless of what g does. Rejecting the o¤er will lower g's pay-o¤ from q + d g to o + d g .
Proof of Proposition 2.3
For the o¤er to succeed it is necessary that q be su¢ ciently high that jLj > m: 12 Recall L = fi; 0 + d i 6 qg denotes the set of individuals whose total bene…t from the cooperative is less than the raider's o¤er. 
